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Abstract
To find the failure propagation mechanism from the complex system of aircraft engine, this paper used the 
topological structure to describe the coupling relations, discussing the role of topological geometry method in the 
failure propagation. The topological structure statistical properties of the system were analyzed with small world net 
theory, and a failure propagation model based on the small world clustering was proposed, and the failure 
propagation paths and relevant key nodes with high pervasion ability were found with the Dijkstra algorithm. The 
results verify that this method can effectively find the weak point in the system, and provide an important basis for 
design improvements and failure prevention.
© 2013 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and peer-review under responsibility of ENAC
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Nomenclature
FADEC Full authority digital engine controller
FMV Fuel metering valve
HMU Hydro mechanical unit
HPC High pressure compressor
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HPTACC High pressure turbine active clearance control
HPT High pressure turbine
TL Thrust lever
LPT Low pressure turbine
LVDT Linear variable differential transformer
RVDT Rotary variable differential transformer
VBV Variable bleed valve
VSV Variable stator vane
nH High pressure rotor speed
nL Low Pressure rotor speed
wf fuel flow
1. Introduction
Airworthiness is the measure of an aircraft or airborne systems and equipment suitability for safe flight. 
Certification of airworthiness is initially conferred by a certificate of airworthiness from a national 
aviation authority, and is maintained by per- forming the required maintenance actions. The application of 
airworthiness defines the condition of an aircraft and supplies the basis for judgment of the suitability for 
flight of that aircraft, in that it has been designed with engineering rigor, constructed, maintained and is 
expected to be operated to approved standards and limitations, by competent and approved individuals, 
who are acting as members of an approved organization and whose work is both certified as correct and 
accepted on behalf of the state. With the development of science and technology of aviation and civil 
aviation, as well as the deepening of aviation safety, the concept of airworthiness is still continuous 
developed. Generally speaking, the definition of airworthiness is an abstract of the whole process of the 
physical collection, and the airworthiness of civil aviation is a quality. This quality requires the aircraft or 
aircraft part should always be harmonized with its models in the design and safe operation of the state 
remains.
Safety is something related to all human activities and therefore every civil society is organized (or 
should be organized) to guarantee public safety in relation to one’s own or others’ activities. This is 
certainly a moral obligation, but it is also a practical demand because accidents, causing damage to 
persons and properties, have a social cost. This is also the reason why human activities that could cause 
damage to persons and properties are controlled by national states through regulations [1]. Safety can also 
be defined to be the control of recognized hazards to achieve an acceptable level of risk.
The ideal objective of system safety is to develop a sys- tem free of hazards [2]. However, absolute 
safety is not possible because complete freedom from all hazardous conditions is not always possible, 
particularly when dealing with complex inherently hazardous systems, such as aero engines, commercial 
aircraft, and nuclear power plants.
Safety analysis is a necessary part of the process of showing that a system is safe to deploy. It is often 
necessary to construct a safety case containing the results of safety analysis and to present this to a 
certification authority in order to get authorization to deploy the system [3].
The ultimate objective of a safety analysis is to ensure that the risk to the aircraft from all engine 
failure conditions is acceptably low. The basis of a safety analysis is the concept that an acceptable total 
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engine design risk is achievable by managing the individual engine risks to acceptable levels. This 
concept emphasizes reducing the likelihood or probability of an event proportionally with the severity of 
its effects. The safety analysis should support the engine design goals so that major or hazardous engine 
effects resulting from engine failure modes do not exceed the required probability of occurrence.
Numerous models and methodologies have been developed to describe, predict and prevent failures or 
faults. These models and methodologies include classical probability principles based models [4], 
Markovian theory based models [5], Poisson theory based models [6], Bayesian theory based models [7], 
Monte Carlo simulation based models [8], Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) [9], Failure Modes and Effect 
Analysis (FMEA) [10, 11], and hybrid models [12].
Although a number of them have been proposed in the literature and used successfully sometimes, 
these methods have very limited applications, especially in the complex coupled systems. All these 
methods, more or less, require information about system layout, failure probability, failure effects of 
components and systems, which are often too expensive to obtain. And these models or methods have 
been mainly developed on the assumption that failures are independent. However, with the progress in 
structure and integration, modern aircraft engines have become more and more complex, and have shown 
that the assumption of independent failures has been unrealistic and has led to unacceptable analysis 
errors. Therefore, the concept of dependent failures was introduced and has been described in [13].
The subject of dependent failures has attracted the interest of researchers for decades. The most 
discussed dependent failures are: cascading failure, negative dependency failure and common cause 
failure [13]. Cascading failure is defined as multiple sequential failures. These failures are initiated by the 
failure of one component, which leads to sequential failures of other components. A component failure 
changes the system topology, which consequently increases the failure probabilities of remaining 
components and a second moment method for estimation the reliability of a system with cascading 
dependency failures [14]. In many real-world networks, the failure of a single or a very few nodes can 
trigger a cascading failures, which can disable the whole network almost entirely [15–18].
This paper introduces a new method for safety analysis based on the conclusions of complex networks. 
From the topological perspective, the relationship between the structural properties of such networks and 
cascading failures in these coupled complex systems is investigated. The network of the aircraft engine 
system is constructed and studied, and by using the methods mentioned in [16,17], the purposes of 
protecting existing system, locating the most critical nodes are studied. This paper is organized as follows: 
In Section 2, the network of aircraft engine sys- tem is constructed, and some definitions of terms and 
measured quantities to study the topological properties are provided. A model for cascading failures based 
on the dynamic redistribution of the load on the network, and the mechanism of cascading is analyzed is 
studied in Section 3. In Section 4, the safety analysis of the aircraft engine system is illustrated. Finally, 
conclusions are provided in Section 5.
2. Network of aircraft engine system
2.1. Construct the network of aircraft engine system
In the typical aircraft engine system, there are many kinds of components, such as HPC and HPT are 
on one shaft (driven by the High Speed Rotor), while the Fan, Booster and LPT are on the other shaft 
(driven by the Low Speed Rotor), Combustor, FADEC, sensors and other valves. All these components 
and devices are connected into a whole system, and the relationship between components and devices 
may be the control information, the energy transmitted by mass flow, etc. The scheme is shown in [19]
figure 1.
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The aircraft engine system was described as a network, the components and devices can be represented 
by the nodes, and the relationship between any two equipment can be represented by the edges as shown 
in Fig. 1 and Tab. 1. Obviously, the network of the system is a relatively complex. Once failures, faults or 
disturbs happened, which maybe caused by a sensor, a valve or other components of the system, it can be 
propagated and amplified, some of these faults can cause cascading failures.
Fig. 1. Network structure of the aircraft engine
Table 1. An example of a table
Node Name Node Name Node Name
1 Fan 9 FADEC 17 LVDT of wf
2 Booster 10 HMU 18 Sensor of LPT outlet temperature
3 HPC 11 FMV 19 Sensor of HPC outlet pressure
4 Combustor 12 VSV 20 Position sensor of HPC stator vane
5 HPT 13 VBV 21 Sensor of Fan outlet temperature
6 LPT 14 HPTACC Valve 22 Position sensor of booster bleed valve
7 Nozzle 15 RVDT of nH
8 TL 16 RVDT of nL
2.2. Definitions of Quantities
The topological statistic parameters are given in this section. Firstly, degree of node is the number 
of edges connected to a node. is the average degree of nodes.
From Fig. 1, we can see that the capacity or intensity of the relationship between nodes may be 
heterogeneous and the direction of the links is crucial in dynamical processes occurring in this network, 
such as information spreading, etc. Therefore, the aircraft engine system network is represented as a 
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weighted directed graph , with nodes and edges. Each edge connects exactly one pair of nodes, 
and a node-pair can be connected by maximally one edge, i.e., multiconnection is not allowed. In addition, 
we introduce the weight matrix , where for and for . The 
adjacency matrix of a directed weighted graph is a matrix with all zeros on the main diagonal, 
and off-diagonal elements
(1)
for . Where, an edge from vertex to vertex in the set is determined and independently 
of other edges with probability , we collect the probabilities in the probability matrix 
.
There are several ways of measuring the functionality of networks. One key quantity is the average 
path length 
(2)
where is the length of the shortest path between and , i.e., the number of edges in the shortest 
path connecting the two, and the factor is one over the number of pairs of nodes. 
Another is clustering coefficient intends to measure the average degree of the local transitivity in a 
network. Let denote the number of edges in the neighborhood of then
(3)
is called the local clustering coefficient of the node . Here the degree of is defined as the number 
of nodes in , i.e., . And . The clustering coefficient is then defined 
as the average of 
(4)
In the studies of networks, the centrality is an important concept that tries to capture the prominence of 
a node in the embedding structure. It should be noted that the node with a low degree can have a high 
centrality and thus attacking the network by removing nodes with high centralities may differ from that 
by degrees. Among many centrality measures we focus on the node betweenness centrality 
defined for a node as follows
(5)
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where is the total number of shortest paths from node to node and is the number of 
those paths that pass through . Note that the betweenness centrality of a node scales with the number of 
pairs of nodes as implied by the summation indices. Therefore the calculation may be rescaled by 
dividing through by the number of pairs of nodes not including . Similarly, one can define the edge 
betweenness centrality for an edge as
(6)
where is the number of shortest paths from node s to node t that includes the edge e. 
Throughout the present paper, we call and as the node betweenness and the edge 
betweenness for brevity. Fig. 2 to Fig. 4 show the aircraft engine system network’s quantities.
Fig. 2.  Node degrees of this network
Fig. 3. Node betweennesses of this network
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Fig. 4.  Edege betweennesses of this network
3. Analysis of failure propagation
3.1. Cascading Failure Modes
A cascading failure is a failure in a system of interconnected parts in which the failure of a part can 
trigger the failure of successive parts. Such a failure may happen in many types of systems, including 
power transmission, computer networking, finance and bridges. Cascading failures usually begin when 
one part of the system fails. When this happens, nearby nodes must then take up the slack for the failed 
component. This overloads these nodes, causing them to fail as well, prompting additional nodes to fail in 
a vicious cycle. These random edges significantly facilitate propagation of contagions such as disease and 
information. For simple propagation-such as the spread of information or disease-in which a single active 
node is sufficient to trigger the activation of its neighbors, random edges connecting other- wise distant 
nodes achieve dramatic gains in propagation rates by creating shortcuts across the graph.
In aircraft engine systems, many significant accidents are caused by a small fault. In fact, the 
breakdown of a single component or device not only has direct consequences on the performance of a 
system, but also can cause an overload and consequently the partial or total breakdown of other 
components, thus generating a cascading effect.
3.2. Model for Cascading Failures in Complex Networks
A generic graph with nodes and edges is considered. is assumed to be unweighted, i.e., 
edges are all equal, sparse , and connected; i.e., there exists at least one path 
connecting any two nodes with a finite number of steps. is therefore represented by simply giving the 
adjacency matrix, i.e., the matrix whose entry if there is an edge joining node to node 
and is otherwise. We define a matrix is physical distances of a network. The number 
can be the space distance between the two nodes or the strength of their possible interaction: we suppose 
to be known even if in the graph there is no edge between and . Of course, in the particular case 
of an unweighted graph . The shortest path length between two generic points and 
is the smallest sum of the physical distances throughout all the possible paths in the graph from to . 
The matrix is therefore calculated by using the information contained both in matrix and in 
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matrix . We have , the equality being valid when there is an edge between and . 
Let us now suppose that the system is parallel, i.e., every node sends information concurrently along the 
network, through its edges. The efficiency in the communication between nodes and can then be 
defined to be inversely proportional to the shortest distance: . When there is no path in 
the graph between and , and, consistently, . The average efficiency of [20]
can be defined as
(7)
and is used as a measure of the performance of .
As mentioned above, for a given network, suppose that at each time step one unit of the relevant 
quantity, which can be information, energy, etc., is exchanged between every pair of nodes and 
transmitted along the shortest path connecting them. The load at a node is then the total number of 
shortest paths passing through the node that is the node betweenness ( ) [17]. The capacity of a node is 
the maximum load that the node can handle. In man-made networks, the capacity is severely limited by 
cost. Thus, it is natural to assume that the capacity of node is proportional to its initial load ,
(8)
where the constant is the tolerance parameter, and is the initial number of nodes. Where 
is the tolerance parameter, and is the initial number of nodes. can be thought of as a 
measure of the stress that the network is under at time . means that network is operating at 
maximum capacity. depicts a network carrying a light load. But, the removal of nodes in general 
changes the distribution of shortest paths. The load at a particular node can then change. If it increases 
and becomes larger than the capacity, the corresponding nodes fail. Any failure leads to a new 
redistribution of loads and, as a result, subsequent failures can occur. This step-by-step process is what 
we call a cascading failure, or a cascade. It can stop after a few steps but it can also propagate and 
shutdown a considerable fraction of the whole network. If a node has a relatively small load, its removal 
will not cause major changes in the balance of loads, and subsequent overload failures are unlikely to 
occur. However, when the load at the node is relatively large, its removal is likely to affect significantly 
loads at other nodes and possibly starts a sequence of overload failures. According to [17]: global 
cascades occur if (1) the network exhibits a highly heterogeneous distribution of loads; (2) the removed 
node is among those with higher load. Otherwise, cascades are not expected. The distribution of loads is 
in turn highly correlated with the distribution of edges: networks with heterogeneous distribution of edges 
are expected to be heterogeneous with respect to load so that on average, nodes with larger number of 
edges will have higher load.
When a node in the system network fails, it will gradually spread to other nodes. In the propagation 
process, the fault or failure will diffuse through those edges which have the larger propagation probability.
The core idea of this model introduced in this paper is when one node is attacked by 
random/premeditated attack or environmental disturbances:
1) Node fails, and its load spreads to its neighbors,
2) All downstream nodes share the spread load, the proportion of shared load is decided by the 
propagation intensity of edges which connected with the failed node and its downstream nodes,
3) Any downstream node fails and spreads to its connected nodes till its capacity is less than its 
total load, on the contrary, the node is safe.
Explanation to the core idea of this paper:
1) Node fails: failure of node has two types, one is by attack or vanish abnormally of the network, 
the other is node’s load higher than its capacity, and the capacity of one failed node is0
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2) In order to describe the propagation intensity of edge, in this paper we define the intensity as
(9)
Where is cross-clustering coefficient (related with structure of the network, ). is 
weighted coefficient of propagation probability. is weighted coefficient of node degree. And 
. represents the one propagation wave probability from node to node , is node 
degree of , and is propagation step.
According to the introduced cascading failure model and the explanation, the algorithm procedure is shown in Fig. 5.
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Fig. 5. Cascading model calculation process
4. Simulations and analysis
4.1. Safety-Critical Components
First, Fig. 6 shows the efficiency of the network after cascading failure triggered by the removal of one 
node of all 23 nodes respectively. While the efficiency is significantly reduced in the case of some node 
(e.g. the node 9, 10), which means the damage caused by a certain node is large, even can destructive the 
whole aircraft engine system network. This result is in agreement with intuition, because not all of a small 
failure can lead to a cascading failure in the network, while some failure which maybe often neglected 
will cause a cascading and bring a huge damage.
Fig. 6. Efficiency of this network
According to the definition of load of a node, we can find that the betweenness of a node is the initial 
load of each node shown in Fig. 3. Obviously, the network exhibits a highly heterogeneous distribution of 
loads, that is, some nodes have a high load while the others have a relatively low load. The Fig. 3 also 
indicates that the damage caused by triggers of higher load (e.g. the node 9 and 10, which FADEC and 
HMU respectively in the system) is much larger than that by triggers of low load, as can be seen from a 
comparison between Fig. 3 and Fig. 6. In order to understand this result, consider the topological 
properties of the network. The network has a heterogeneous distribution of node degree distribution (see
Fig. 2; the distribution of loads is highly correlated with the distribution of edges, so that on aver- age, 
nodes with larger number of edges will have higher load. If the node has large load, its removal is likely 
to affect significantly the load at other nodes and possibly starts a sequence of overload failures. However, 
when the load at the node is small, its removal will not cause major changes in the balance of loads and 
possibly cause a small failure. That is to say that the FADEC and HMU are the safety-critical components 
in this topological network.
4.2. Failure Propagation Procedure Analysis
According to the model of propagation path, we can get the probable failure node when one node fails 
which shown in Table 2. Fig. 7 show the intentional attacking with nodes by nodes (the purple node is the 
attacked node, and the orange nodes are the propagated nodes), and the result of attacking nodes 15 to 22 
is same like the (o) shows. And according to the Dijkstra algorithm, the most possible propagation path 
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( or ) is shown in (p). That 
is to say, when FADEC fails, it will cause a fault of HPC, for example, compressor surge that is not 
allowed. This finding has important practical application in safety analysis in in aircraft engine control 
system; we can identify some crucial components and take a perfect protection to ensure the whole 
system performance. In addition, it can provide guidance in designing more attack-robust system.
Table 2. Probable failure node
Initial Node Probable Failure Node Initial Node Probable Failure Node
1 2, 21, 22 12 3, 19, 20
2 3, 19, 20, 22 13 2, 3, 22
3 4, 9, 19, 20 14 3, 5, 6, 15
4 3, 5, 6, 15 15 9, 10
5 3, 4, 6, 15, 19, 20 16 9
6 1, 2, 7, 16, 18 17 9, 10
7 Null 18 9, 10
8 9, 10 19 9, 10
9 10, 14 20 9, 10
10 11, 12, 13, 14, 5 21 9, 10
11 9, 17 22 9, 10
(a) (b)
(c) (d)








Fig. 7. Typical failure mode
Selecting node 1 is a failure node, and the downstream node is node 2, so the load of node 1 is 
transferred into node 2. While the capacity of node 2 is less than its load, and the node 2 is failed. 
Consequently, downstream nodes of node 2 are node 3 and node 22, the load of node 2 is propagated
proportionally into node 3 and node 22, and the two capacities of node 22 and 3 are less than their loads 
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respectively, so the cascading failure is still going on. The downstream node of node 22 is node 9, and the 
capacity of node 9 is higher than its load, so the node 9 is in safety state. However, the downstream of 
node 3 is node 20 and node 19, but their capacities are less than their loads respectively, so the cascading 
failure is still occurred. Then the downstream node of node 20 and node 19 is the same node 9. Because 
of the larger capacity of node 9, so the cascading failure is stop, and the cascading failure propagation is 




Fig. 8. Typical failure mode
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Conclusions
In this paper, we introduce a new method for safety analysis and assessment based on recent advances 
in complex networks. First, we construct the networks and study the topological properties. The model is 
based on a dynamical redistribution of the flow triggered by the initial breakdown of a component of the 
system. The results show that the breakdown of a single node is sufficient to affect the efficiency of a 
network up to the col- lapse of the entire system if the node is among the ones with the largest load. This 
is particularly important for networks with a highly heterogeneous distribution of node loads. The results 
verify that this method can effectively find the weak point in the system. Therefore, we can identify the 
components of a system network that are crucial to the functioning of the system, which can be used for 
protection and design a safe of complex system.
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